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Abstract 
Simultaneous hermaphroditism is predicted to be unstable at high mating rates given an 
associated increase in sperm competition. The existence of reciprocal egg trading, which 
requires both hermaphroditism and high mating rates to evolve, is consequently hard to 
explain. We show using mathematical models that the presence of a trading economy creates 
an additional fitness benefit to egg production, which selects for traders to bias their sex 
allocation towards the female function. This female-biased sex allocation prevents pure 
females from invading a trading population, thereby allowing simultaneous hermaphroditism 
to persist stably at much higher levels of sperm competition than would otherwise be 
expected. More generally, our model highlights that simultaneous hermaphroditism can 
persist stably when mating opportunities are abundant, as long as sperm competition remains 
low. It also predicts that reciprocity will select for heavier investment in the traded resource. 
 
Keywords: gamete trading, reciprocal altruism, cooperation, gonochorism, dioecy 
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Most altruistic behaviour is directed towards close relatives, where it is thought to have 
evolved due to indirect fitness benefits according to the theory of kin selection (Hamilton 
1964; West et al. 2002; Sachs et al. 2004). Apparent altruism towards non-kin is nonetheless 
a regular occurrence in some species (Dugatkin 1999). For example, vampire bats share 
blood meals with both kin and non-kin (Wilkinson 1984; Carter and Wilkinson 2013) and 
allogrooming in social mammals is similarly not restricted to close relatives (Hart and Hart 
1992; Barrett et al. 1999). Such behaviour is often most plausibly explained as direct 
reciprocity, whereby two individuals alternate in helping each other at an immediate cost to 
their own fitness (Trivers 1971; Sachs et al. 2004; Bshary 2010).  
 
For direct reciprocity to be adaptive, the net fitness benefit of receiving help must exceed the 
cost of helping, so that both individuals expect to come out ahead over multiple interactions. 
Direct reciprocity is thus strictly speaking a kind of asynchronous cooperation; however, it is 
sometimes referred to as ‗reciprocal altruism‘ because each act of helping is costly to the 
donor when viewed in isolation from the recipient‘s delayed response (Trivers 1971; West et 
al. 2007; Krams et al. 2008; Rutte and Taborsky 2008). 
 
Direct reciprocity between non-kin is apparently rare outside of humans and few instances 
have been documented rigorously (Hammerstein 2003; Clutton-Brock 2009). A likely reason 
for this rarity is that an individual only benefits from cooperating if its partner returns the 
favour. Consequently, some level of conditional cooperation must already be present before 
direct reciprocity can invade (the ‗bootstrapping problem‘: André 2014). This pre-existing 
cooperation must have arisen via a mechanism other than reciprocity, although how this 
happens is poorly understood (André 2015).  
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To explain the origins and maintenance of direct reciprocity in general, it is helpful to view 
these questions in the context of the few well-documented examples of reciprocity in nature. 
One of the most convincing cases is ‗egg trading‘ among simultaneous hermaphrodites 
(Petersen 2006; Crowley and Hart 2007). When egg traders mate, they do not release all of 
their eggs in one go. Instead, they divide their clutch into several small parcels, and partners 
take turns in offering each other a parcel of eggs to fertilise externally. Partners that do not 
reciprocate egg release may be deserted and another partner sought (Friedman and 
Hammerstein 1991). Egg trading has been demonstrated in several species of the seabass 
family (Fischer 1981; 1984a; Fischer and Petersen 1987; Petersen 1995; 2006), and may also 
occur in some polychaete worms and an opisthobranch sea slug (Leonard and Lukowiak 
1984; Sella et al. 1997; Sella and Lorenzi 2000). 
 
By offering eggs only to partners who reciprocate, traders increase their reproductive success 
in the male role, effectively using their eggs as ‗bargaining chips‘ in exchange for fertilisation 
opportunities. Egg trading thus partially resolves the sexual conflict that arises from a general 
preference for the male mating role in many hermaphroditic species (Anthes et al. 2006; Hart 
et al. 2011; Schärer et al. 2014). This mating role preference is an expected consequence of 
anisogamy. Eggs are costlier than sperm to replenish, which means that the optimal mating 
rate is higher in the male role than in the female role. It consequently pays to be choosier 
when mating as a female (Clutton-Brock and Parker 1992; Schärer et al. 2012; Henshaw et al. 
2014b; although note that this argument can break down if individuals mating in the male 
role provide direct benefits to their partners such as nuptial gifts or parental investment: 
Clutton-Brock and Vincent 1991; Johnstone et al. 1996; Kokko et al. 2006). 
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Like most cases of direct reciprocity, the origins of egg trading are yet to be fully explained. 
Previous theory has, however, shown that egg trading can go to fixation in a population once 
traders are sufficiently common, a form of positive frequency-dependent selection (Henshaw 
et al. 2014b). Here we model how egg trading affects the evolution of sex allocation and the 
stability of hermaphroditism. We show that once egg trading has evolved, it selects for 
female-biased sex allocation. This protects hermaphroditism from invasion by separate sexes 
under the ‗twice-the-fitness rule‘ (Charnov 1982; Fischer 1988; Michiels et al. 2009; see 
below). Simultaneous hermaphroditism (and, by extension, egg trading) can then persist 
under higher levels of sperm competition than would otherwise be predicted. 
 
Sperm competition and the rate of mate encounters 
Sperm competition is incorporated into our model in the form of ‗streaking‘, in which 
unpaired individuals approach a spawning pair and attempt to fertilise any released eggs with 
their own sperm (Fischer 1984a; 1987). Streaking is observed in most (though not all) species 
of egg-trading serranid fish (Petersen 2006) and similar behaviours known taxon-dependently 
as ‗streaking‘ or ‗sneaking‘ are widespread in external fertilisers (Taborsky et al. 2008). 
Streakers are often physically more distant from released eggs than the mating pair and may 
be the target of aggression from the individual mating in the male role (Oliver 1997). As a 
result, streakers may not compete for paternity on an equal footing (Crowley and Hart 2007; 
Hart et al. 2011). We account for this by incorporating a paternity ‗discount‘ for streakers 
relative to the male-role mate. 
 
We follow previous theory in assuming that when encounters with potential mates occur 
more often, opportunities to streak are also more frequent (arrow A in figure 1; Henshaw et 
al. 2014b). This is biologically plausible if both mating and streaking opportunities depend on 
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underlying factors such as population density and movement patterns (c.f. Kokko and Rankin 
2006). However, we also consider the effects of streaking independent of the mate encounter 
rate by varying the maximum number of streakers per mating pair and the window of time 
that streakers have to make a successful approach after a pair commences spawning (see 
supporting information). This is important because previous theory indicates that high mating 
rates facilitate the fixation of egg trading, whereas high streaking rates impede it (arrows B 
and C in figure 1; Henshaw et al. 2014b). 
 
The twice-the-fitness rule 
Before considering how egg trading and simultaneous hermaphroditism interact in our model, 
it is helpful to revisit the logic underlying most models of the evolution of hermaphroditism. 
Every individual produced by sexual reproduction has exactly one mother and one father. The 
average fitness gained through male and female roles must therefore be equal when viewed 
across the whole population (the Fisher condition: Houston and McNamara 2005). An 
immediate consequence is that the average overall fitness in a population of hermaphrodites 
must equal twice the average fitness in either the female role or male role alone. 
 
For a pure female to invade a hermaphroditic population, her expected fitness must equal or 
exceed that of an average hermaphrodite. By the above argument, this is equivalent to twice 
the average female-role fitness of a hermaphrodite (Charnov 1982). Assuming that female-
role fitness increases roughly in proportion to egg production, this means that pure females 
can invade only if they produce at least twice as many eggs as hermaphrodites (Charlesworth 
1999; Michiels et al. 2009). Pure males can similarly invade if they gain twice the male-role 
fitness of hermaphrodites. This is unlikely to result from simply doubling their sperm 
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production, however, because fertilisation success is rarely due to a pure lottery-like process 
that yields linear returns on sperm production (Pannell 2002; Charlesworth 2008; see below). 
 
Sperm competition, sex allocation, and the stability of hermaphroditism 
The ‗twice-the-fitness rule‘ helps to explain why simultaneous hermaphroditism is predicted 
to be stable only when sperm competition is low (Heath 1977; Charnov 1979; Puurtinen and 
Kaitala 2002; Eppley and Jesson 2008). Two key assumptions underlie most theoretical work 
on this topic. First, individuals have fixed budgets for gamete production, such that 
investments in sperm and eggs trade off against each other in a linear way (Charnov 1996; 
Schärer 2009). Second, pure males and pure females have larger gamete budgets than 
hermaphrodites, owing to efficiency advantages when specialising in one gamete type (Heath 
1977; Charnov 1982; Van de Paer et al. 2015) . 
 
When the risk of sperm competition is low, hermaphrodites only need to make enough sperm 
to fertilise their mates‘ eggs (Michiels et al. 2009). Assuming as above that excess 
reproductive capacity is diverted towards egg production, this means that hermaphrodites will 
show strongly female-biased sex allocation. Consequently, for a pure female to double the 
egg production of an average hermaphrodite, her budget for eggs must be substantially larger 
than a hermaphrodite‘s overall gamete budget. For example, if hermaphrodites allocate 0.75 
of their resources towards the female function, then a pure female‘s budget must be 1.5 times 
larger than a hermaphrodite‘s in order to invade. We refer to this number as the invasion 
threshold for pure females. When sperm competition is weak, the invasion threshold is high. 
Any efficiency advantage that females gain by specialising in one sex may then be 
insufficient to exceed the threshold. In this case, simultaneous hermaphroditism is stable 
against invasion by pure females. 
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Pure males also fare poorly when sperm competition is weak, because this leads to strongly 
diminishing male-role fitness returns as sperm production increases (i.e. share of paternity is 
not linearly related to sperm production: Schärer 2009). The fitness of pure males is 
consequently only slightly higher than the male-role fitness of hermaphrodites, falling short 
of the double fitness needed to invade. As a whole, therefore, simultaneous hermaphroditism 
is predicted to be stable under low sperm competition, because neither pure females nor pure 
males invade easily under these conditions. 
 
Conversely, strong sperm competition can destabilise simultaneous hermaphroditism (arrow 
D in figure 1). When an individual faces many sperm competitors, any increase in its sperm 
production will result in nearly linear fitness returns. Hermaphrodites are consequently 
selected to split their reproductive resources roughly equally between sperm and egg 
production (Charnov 1982; Fischer 1984b). Pure females then require only a small efficiency 
advantage to double the egg production of hermaphrodites and exceed the invasion threshold 
(Heath 1977). Similarly, the almost linear fitness returns on sperm production mean that pure 
males can outcompete hermaphrodites by producing slightly more than twice as many sperm. 
 
How does egg trading protect simultaneous hermaphroditism from invasion? 
Egg trading is predicted to evolve most easily when the risk of sperm competition 
(i.e. streaking) is low, but to be stable once it is fixed in a population (Henshaw et al. 2014b). 
We show here that not only is egg trading stable itself, it also helps protect simultaneous 
hermaphroditism from invasion by separate sexes. This allows hermaphroditism to persist 
stably at higher levels of sperm competition than would be predicted in the absence of egg 
trading. 
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Egg trading selects against both pure males and pure females, although for different reasons. 
Since pure males produce no eggs of their own, they cannot gain fitness by swapping eggs 
with traders. Instead, their only pathway to reproductive success in a trading population is via 
streaking on mating pairs. This puts them at a disadvantage to hermaphrodites, which gain 
fitness through both trading with mates and streaking. 
 
For pure females, egg trading is disadvantageous because it selects for female-biased sex 
allocation. The existence of a trading economy creates an additional source of values for 
eggs: they can be used as ‗bargaining chips‘ in exchange for fertilisation opportunities. 
Higher egg production thus increases fitness in both the male and female roles. Of course, the 
trade-off between egg and sperm production still applies, and so traders that increase their 
egg production will achieve lower paternity under sperm competition. The increased value of 
eggs in a trading population nonetheless selects for more female-biased sex allocation than is 
predicted among non-traders. By the same ‗twice-the-fitness‘ argument as above, this makes 
it more difficult for pure females to invade and thereby stabilises simultaneous 
hermaphroditism (arrows F and G in figure 1). 
 
Model 
Our model considers large, well-mixed populations of simultaneous hermaphrodites in which 
generations overlap and sexual reproduction is obligate. We assume that all reproduction 
occurs via outcrossing, because although many egg-trading species are self-compatible, self-
fertilisation has never been observed under natural conditions (Fischer and Petersen 1987; 
Sella et al. 1997; Petersen 2006). We model trading behaviour of a very simple type. At any 
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point in time, each individual in the population either is or is not carrying a batch of eggs. 
When a trader encounters a potential mate, it will offer up its own eggs for fertilisation only if 
its mate is also carrying eggs. In contrast, non-traders always offer up their eggs, regardless 
of whether their mate can reciprocate. This simple model of trading yielded similar results to 
more sophisticated simulations of ‗egg-for-egg‘ trading in a previous study (Henshaw et al. 
2014b). 
 
We first calculate evolutionarily stable sex allocation for populations of traders and non-
traders to show that egg trading leads to relatively female-biased sex allocation. We then 
determine the conditions under which pure males and pure females can invade a 
hermaphroditic population. As is standard in invasion analyses, we assume that unisexual 
individuals are initially rare, so that all of their mating interactions are with hermaphrodites. 
Our invasion criteria are based on the assumption of nuclear inheritance of genes for sex 
allocation (see discussion). 
 
Sex allocation from a fixed budget 
We assume that all hermaphrodites have the same fixed resource budget of one unit for 
gamete production (Parker 2011). A proportion   of this budget is allocated to male 
reproduction, while     goes to female reproduction (Charnov 1996). We allow that pure 
males and pure females have a larger budget of     due to efficiency advantages of 
specialising in one type of gamete (Heath 1977; Henshaw et al. 2014a; Van de Paer et al. 
2015). 
 
Hermaphrodites that are not already carrying eggs produce a new batch at a rate of    . 
This means that individuals with more female-biased sex allocation replenish their eggs more 
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quickly after they are fertilised. On the other hand, individuals that allocate greater resources 
to male function gain higher paternity under sperm competition (see below). 
 
Mating and paternity 
All individuals, regardless of whether or not they carry eggs, encounter potential mates at a 
rate of  per unit time. A mating commences if both individuals are traders carrying eggs, or 
if at least one individual is a non-trader carrying eggs. A mating pair may also be joined by 
unpaired streakers that release sperm but not eggs. Streakers are chosen at random from the 
general population (i.e. they are not a distinct class of individual). We derive our main results 
assuming that there is at most one streaker per mating pair, but we relax this assumption in 
the supporting information online. 
 
After a mating commences, there is a fixed window of time   during which a streaker can 
join the mating pair. If we assume that streakers encounter mating pairs at the same rate as 
unpaired individuals encounter one another, then the probability that a streaker arrives during 
this window is given by (Otto and Day 2007) 
 
   1 exps m    (1) 
 
Larger windows of time   correspond to a higher chance that a streaker is present, and thus to 
stronger sperm competition. 
 
If there are no streakers, then all released eggs are fertilised by the mating partner. When 
streakers are present, however, paternity is decided by a skewed raffle, where each 
individual‘s share of paternity increases according to its investment   in sperm production 
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(Parker 1990). To account for possible disadvantage to streakers in competition for 
fertilisations, we discount their expected paternity by a factor of       relative to the 
male-role individual in the mating pair. At the upper limit of    , streakers are at no 
disadvantage relative to the male-role mate, whereas smaller values of   correspond to 
increasing streaker disadvantage. 
 
Consider now a mutant individual with sex allocation    in a population where every other 
individual has sex allocation  . When the mutant mates with another individual, there is a 
probability   that the pair is joined by a streaker. In this case, the mutant‘s average share of 
paternity is 
r
r dr

 
. If no streaker attends the mating, which occurs with probability    , 
then the mutant gains full paternity. The mutant‘s average share of paternity is thus 
 
 
 'M 1
r
p s s
r dr
 
   
 


 (2) 
 
By a similar argument, when the mutant individual acts as a streaker, its average share of 
paternity is given by 
 
 
 
'
'
S
'
dr
p
r dr


 (3) 
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Sex allocation of non-traders 
We now show that populations of egg traders have female-biased sex allocation relative to 
non-trading populations. We begin by calculating the evolutionarily stable sex allocation   
  
for non-traders. 
 
Consider a non-trading population with sex allocation   that is invaded by a mutant with sex 
allocation   . The mutant can gain reproductive success from three possible sources: 
fertilisation of its own eggs by a mate or streaker; fertilising the eggs of a mating partner; and 
streaking. We consider each of these sources in turn. 
 
First, the mutant produces new batches of eggs at a rate of 1 'r  and gets them fertilised at a 
rate of  (this includes fertilisation by both the male-role mate and streakers). The average 
proportion of time that it spends carrying eggs is thus 'N
1 '
1 '
r
q
m r


 
. Since the mutant 
encounters mates at a rate of , this leads to its own eggs being fertilised at a rate of   
  
batches per unit time. 
 
Second, since a proportion N
1
1
r
q
m r


 
 of the population is carrying eggs at any one time, 
the mutant encounters egg-carrying mates at a rate of   . The mutant‘s average share of 
paternity from such encounters is 'Mp , yielding male-role reproductive success of 
'
M Np mq . 
 
Lastly, each mating pair is attended by a streaker with probability  , and so the mutant 
encounters streaking opportunities at a rate of 
1
2
sm  (the factor of one half arises because 
each mating pair consists of two individuals). Each individual in the mating pair is carrying 
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eggs with probability   , so the expected total number of egg batches released by both 
individuals is N2q . The mutant fertilises an average proportion   
  of these eggs, leading to 
male-role reproductive success of   
       due to streaking. 
 
Combining these three sources gives us the mutant‘s total reproductive success: 
 
  ' ' ' 'N N M N S Nw mq p mq p smq    (4) 
 
The evolutionarily stable sex allocation   
  is then given by solving the equation 
 
 
 
'
N
'
0
'
r r
w
r




 (5) 
 
subject to the second-derivative test (Christiansen 1991). This yields 
 
 
 
 
22
*
N
8 1
1
4
d d sm
r
ds
   
   (6) 
 
where 
   22 1ds d m      
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Sex allocation of traders 
We now calculate the evolutionarily stable sex allocation   
  in a population of traders. We 
write    for the proportion of time a typical trader spends carrying eggs. As before, such 
individuals produce new batches of eggs at a rate of    . However, they offer eggs only to 
mates that can reciprocate, which they encounter at a rate of   . The value of    is thus 
found by solving the equation T
T
1
1
r
q
mq r


 
. Similarly, for a mutant with sex allocation    
the proportion of time spent carrying eggs is given by 'Tq 
T
1 '
1 '
r
mq r

 
. For the same sex 
allocation, traders spend a greater proportion of their time carrying eggs than non-traders, 
because they are choosier about releasing eggs. 
 
By analogous reasoning to the non-trader case, a mutant trader‘s total reproductive success is 
given by 
  
  ' ' ' ' ' 2T T T M T T S Tw mq q p mq q p smq    (7) 
 
We can then calculate the equilibrium sex allocation   
  for traders numerically using the 
analogue of equation (5). 
 
Egg trading leads to female-biased sex allocation 
By comparing the results of the previous two sections, we see that egg-trading populations 
have consistently more female-biased sex allocation than non-traders (figure 2a) regardless of 
the mating rate  and the risk of streakers being present (as determined by the window of 
time for streakers  ). This is because of the additional value eggs gain by their role in the 
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trading economy. In both trading and non-trading populations, sex allocation moderates a 
trade off between male and female fitness. Any increase in egg production reduces the 
resources available for sperm, which diminishes an individual‘s success in sperm 
competition. For traders, however, higher egg production also means having more eggs to 
trade, which generates additional mating opportunities in the male role. Increases in female 
allocation are thus less detrimental to male fitness in traders than they are in non-traders, and 
this results in relatively female-biased sex allocation in trading populations. 
 
If multiple streakers can attend a mating pair, our prediction of female-biased sex allocation 
among egg traders continues to hold, at least for biologically reasonable choices of the 
parameter values (figure 2a; see supporting information online for details). For example, the 
prediction holds whenever the maximum number of streakers attending any given mating pair 
       , the mating rate     , and the window of time for streakers      . To 
justify these values, we note that if      then individuals would encounter more than one 
hundred potential mates in the time that it takes to produce a batch of eggs, while       
would mean that spawning takes more than one tenth as much time as egg production 
(assuming sex allocation of      , as our model predicts). 
 
When can separate sexes invade? The non-trader case 
We now show that female-biased sex allocation protects egg-trading populations from 
invasion by separate sexes. We assume that both pure males and pure females have a resource 
budget of     for gamete production. Hermaphroditic populations use their equilibrium sex 
allocations *Nr  or 
*
Tr  (derived above). We also assume that mutations affecting sex allocation 
and trading behaviour occur at separate loci, so that unisexual mutants follow the trading 
strategy of the population they invade (e.g. pure female mutants in a trading population are 
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also traders). The existence of pleiotropic mutations affecting both sex allocation and trading 
behaviour would change our conclusions (see supporting information). 
 
Consider first a population of non-trading hermaphrodites. Typical individuals in the 
population are carrying eggs a proportion 
*
* N
N *
N
1
1
r
q
m r


 
 of the time and get them fertilised 
at a rate of . This results in average reproductive success of   
  in the female role. Since 
average reproductive success in the male and female role must be equal (due to the Fisher 
condition), the average total reproductive success of a hermaphrodite is simply 
 
  *N N2w mq  (8) 
 
 
Consider now a pure male mutant in a population of non-trading hermaphrodites. The male 
can gain reproductive success both as a mate and via streaking. Since the male‘s sperm 
production is proportional to  , his average paternity as the male-role mate in a pair is 
 
 mM s 1
A
p s
A dr
 
   
 
 
(9) 
 
His average paternity when streaking is similarly 
 
 mS
dA
p
r dA


 
 
(10) 
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The mutant male‘s total reproductive success is then given by the sum of his reproductive 
success as a mate and as a streaker 
 
 m m * m *N M N S Nw p mq p smq   (11) 
 
 
Similarly, a pure female mutant produces new batches of eggs at a rate of   and gets them 
fertilised at a rate of . She therefore spends 
 
   
 of her time carrying eggs and her average 
reproductive success is 
 
 
 fN
A
w m
m A
 
  
 
 
(12) 
 
 
Under which conditions can a unisexual individual invade a population of non-traders? For 
pure males, it is impossible that   
    , because each of     
  and   
  is less than one. 
This means that pure males cannot invade when we make the assumption, used in this 
section, that there is at most one streaker per mating pair. On the other hand, a pure female 
can invade if   
    . By substituting in equations (8) and (12) and simplifying, this 
inequality holds if and only if both of the following conditions are met:  
 
 
 
 
 
*
N
N *
N
2 1
1
m r
A A
m r

 
 
 
(13) 
  *N1m r   
 
  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.   19 
 
In other words, a pure female can invade when potential mates are encountered at least as 
often as eggs batches are produced, and when the efficiency advantage of producing only one 
type of gamete exceeds the invasion threshold   . This threshold thus represents the 
minimum efficiency advantage that pure females would need to invade. For example, if 
      , then a pure female can only invade if her expenditure on egg production is at least 
20% greater than the overall gamete budget of a hermaphrodite. Note that the invasion 
threshold is always greater than one, so at least some efficiency advantage is required for a 
pure female to invade (see discussion). 
 
When can separate sexes invade? The trader case 
For populations of traders, the calculations are similar. Hermaphrodites spend   
  of their time 
carrying eggs, where *Tq  is found by solving the equation 
*
* T
T * *
T T
1
 1
r
q
mq r


 
. They encounter 
egg-carrying mates at a rate of   
 . This leads to reproductive success of (  
 )  in the 
female role and to total reproductive success of 
 
 
  
2
*
T T2w m q  
(14) 
 
For a pure male mutant, the only possible source of reproductive success is streaking, since 
no one will trade eggs with an individual that does not reciprocate. The total reproductive 
success of a pure male is thus 
 
  
2
m m *
T S Tw p sm q  
(15) 
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A pure female mutant produces new batches of eggs at a rate of   and gets them fertilised at a 
rate of   
 . This means that she spends a proportion 
*
T
A
mq A
 of her time carrying eggs and 
her reproductive success is 
 
 
 f *T T *
T
A
w mq
mq A
 
  
 
 
(16) 
 
 
As in the non-trader case, it is impossible for a pure male to invade a population of egg-
trading hermaphrodites. Pure females can invade if T T
fw w , which holds if both: 
 
 
 
 
 
* *
T T
T * *
T T
2 1
1
mq r
A A
mq r

 
 
 
(17) 
  * *T T1q m r   
 
This means that a pure female can invade if egg-carrying mates are encountered at least as 
often as it takes to produce a batch of eggs and if the efficiency advantage of specialising in 
one type of gamete exceeds the invasion threshold   . 
 
Egg trading protects hermaphroditism from invasion 
We can now determine how egg trading affects the stability of simultaneous 
hermaphroditism. Since egg traders have relatively female-biased sex allocation, we must 
have   
    
 , and we also know that   
   . Consequently, the invasion threshold for traders 
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   defined in equation (17) is higher than the threshold for non-traders    in equation (13). 
This means that unisexual individuals need a larger gamete budget (i.e. a greater efficiency 
advantage) to invade an egg-trading population than to invade a non-trading population. Egg 
trading therefore makes it more difficult for separate sexes to invade a hermaphroditic 
population (figure 2b). 
 
This prediction continues to hold if we allow multiple streakers to attend a mating pair, 
assuming biologically reasonable parameter values as above (figure 2b). In this more general 
scenario, it is sometimes possible for pure males, and not only pure females, to invade a 
population of hermaphrodites. This is because when multiple streakers can attend a mating 
pair, the resultant increase in sperm competition and opportunities for streaking make sperm 
production a more profitable path to fitness. The conditions for pure male invasion are, 
however, more stringent than those for pure females, so we should still expect females to 
invade more easily than males. 
 
The effects of streaking and the rate of mate encounters 
For both traders and non-traders, our model predicts that higher rates of streaking should lead 
to more equal (i.e. less female-biased) sex allocation (figure 2a). As a result, pure females can 
invade a hermaphroditic population more easily when streaking is common (figure 2b). This 
also means that hermaphroditism is less stable when potential mates are encountered 
frequently, since we assume a positive relationship between streaking and mate encounter 
rates. If streaking is completely absent, our model predicts highly female-biased sex 
allocation and stable hermaphroditism. 
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If streakers are highly disadvantaged in sperm competition (small  ), then sex allocation is 
more female-biased and it is more difficult for unisexual individuals to invade (figure S2 in 
the supporting information online). This is because a strong bias against streakers reduces the 
effective level of sperm competition. 
 
Discussion 
Like most cases of direct reciprocity, the initial evolution of egg trading is puzzling (André 
2015): how can trading invade a population, given that its success relies on an established 
market for eggs (Fischer 1984a; Noë 2001)? Our model shows that, when viewed in the 
context of hermaphroditic mating systems, the abstract conditions for the evolution of 
reciprocity have fascinating consequences. Eggs are the final pathway to fitness in the female 
role and so egg trading interacts with both individual sex allocation and the population 
stability of simultaneous hermaphroditism. This raises an interesting dilemma. Previous 
theory has indicated that egg trading will go to fixation only if encounters with potential 
mates occur frequently, because this increases the chances that a rare egg trader will find a 
reciprocating partner (Henshaw et al. 2014b). However, hermaphroditism itself is predicted to 
be unstable at high mating rates if there is an associated increase in sperm competition due to 
streakers more often encountering mating pairs (Heath 1977; Charnov 1979; Puurtinen and 
Kaitala 2002; Eppley and Jesson 2008). 
 
To resolve this dilemma, it is helpful to distinguish between conditions favouring the fixation 
of egg trading and those that ensure its maintenance. Once egg trading is established in a 
population, our model predicts that it will ‗protect‘ simultaneous hermaphroditism from 
invasion by unisexual individuals (Fischer 1988; Michiels et al. 2009). Egg trading and 
  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.   23 
 
hermaphroditism can then persist stably under a broad range of mating parameters, including 
under conditions of strong sperm competition where hermaphroditism would normally be 
predicted to be unstable (figures 2b and S2). 
 
Egg trading protects against invasion of both pure females and pure males, but for different 
reasons. The existence of a trading economy increases the fitness value of eggs, as they can 
be traded for fertilisation opportunities in the male role. Traders consequently bias their sex 
allocation towards the female function (cf. Greeff and Michiels 1999, where reciprocal sperm 
exchange is associated with increased male allocation). This female-biased sex allocation 
makes it harder for pure females to double the egg production of hermaphrodites, as they 
must do in order to invade (the ‗twice-the fitness‘ rule: see introduction). Pure males are also 
disadvantaged by egg trading, but in a more straightforward way: it excludes them entirely 
from the trading economy (i.e. pair mating), so that their only path to fitness is via streaking. 
 
Our model explains how simultaneous hermaphroditism is maintained once egg trading is 
fixed in a population. However, we are left to understand how hermaphroditism can persist 
without egg trading at the high mating rates needed for trading to initially become established 
(Henshaw et al. 2014b). One possibility is that trading evolves in species where high rates of 
mate encounter do not elevate the strength of sperm competition. In some egg-trading 
species, sperm competition is indeed low or even non-existent, although in others streaking is 
frequent (Fischer 1984b; Petersen 2006).  It is thus possible that ancestral egg-trading species 
combined low sperm competition with abundant mating opportunities. Our model predicts 
that simultaneous hermaphroditism will be stable under these conditions (cf. Charnov 1979). 
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One potential cause for low sperm competition is if streakers are highly disadvantaged in 
competition with the male-role mate of a spawning pair. This is possible if male-role 
individuals can easily monopolise their mates, or if female-role individuals prefer to mate 
monandrously (Taborsky 1998). Our model predicts more strongly female-biased sex 
allocation in such cases, which makes it more difficult for pure females to invade. Analogous 
reductions in sperm production are predicted in many situations where paternity is skewed 
heavily towards some males over others, such as when there is strong first- or last-male 
sperm precedence (Parker 1990; Greeff et al. 2001; Williams et al. 2005; Fromhage et al. 
2008). 
 
It is important to note that hermaphroditism may persist even under high sperm competition 
due to phylogenetic constraints on the evolution of separate sexes (Williams 1975; Michiels 
et al. 2009). Current theory is inadequate to explain when and how such constraints operate 
(Schärer 2009; Leonard 2013). Although phylogenetic inertia undoubtedly plays a role, 
fine-grained theoretical studies such as ours have the potential to reveal general ‗rules‘ that 
explain far more of the distribution of hermaphroditism than is currently possible (Erisman et 
al. 2013). For instance, our results suggest that understanding the relationship between mate 
availability and the level of sperm competition is crucial to explaining the distribution of 
hermaphroditism. 
 
Our model predicts that unisexual individuals can only invade a hermaphroditic population if 
they gain an efficiency advantage from specialising in one type of gamete (i.e. the predicted 
invasion thresholds    and    always exceed one). This result depends on our assumption 
that egg traders do not self-fertilise, which is consistent with the empirical evidence (Fischer 
and Petersen 1987; Sella et al. 1997; Petersen 2006). By contrast, in hermaphroditic species 
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that self-fertilise to some extent, inbreeding depression may reduce the average fitness of 
offspring. Pure females may then invade more easily, potentially even without any resource 
advantage, if they produce offspring of higher quality than self-fertilising hermaphrodites 
(Charlesworth and Charlesworth 1978; Charlesworth 1999). The evolution of cytoplasmic 
‗male sterility‘ factors may also allow the invasion of pure females without an increase in 
overall resources for gamete production. Such mutations are selected for if they produce any 
increase in female-role fitness, even if this means a reduction in overall fitness, but they may 
be opposed by counter-selection for nuclear modifiers that reduce or nullify their effects 
(Charlesworth 1999). 
 
While much theoretical work seeks to explain the evolutionary origins of direct reciprocity 
(Trivers 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Nowak 2006; André 2015), fewer studies have 
explored its consequences for the evolution of other traits. Our model predicts that once 
reciprocity has evolved, individuals will tend to invest more heavily in producing the traded 
resource (in our case, eggs). This may occur in other systems where the currency of 
reciprocity must be produced or collected. For instance, individuals in food-sharing species 
may gather more food than they would need in the absence of a trading economy, due to the 
expected future benefits of donating excess food (Rutte and Taborsky 2008; Carter and 
Wilkinson 2013). 
 
Our model reveals general patterns but it has a few important limitations. First, it assumes 
that all individuals are alike in their gamete production, their desirability as mates, and their 
streaking potential. Evidence in several egg-trading species suggests, however, that both 
fecundity and the number of female partners increase with an individual‘s body size, and in 
some species streaking rates are higher for smaller individuals (Petersen and Fischer 1996; 
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Oliver 1997; Petersen 2006). There may consequently be interrelationships between sex 
allocation and mating behaviour for which our model fails to account. Second, our model 
assumes that the only resource trade-off an individual faces is between sperm and egg 
production, whereas reproductive success may also depend heavily on investment in 
attracting or competing for mates (Parker et al. 2013). Indeed, many egg-traders engage in 
vigorous courtship displays prior to spawning, which presumably divert resources away from 
gamete production (Sella 1985; Fischer and Petersen 1987; Friedman and Hammerstein 1991; 
Lorenzi et al. 2006). Third, our model does not consider cheating in any other form than 
opportunistic streaking; traders are always assumed to reciprocate egg release perfectly (note 
that other theoretical studies have considered this issue in detail: Friedman and Hammerstein 
1991; Crowley and Hart 2007). Fourth, our model only considers the initial invasion of 
unisexual individuals into a hermaphroditic population. It does not predict whether a 
successful invasion will eventually lead to separate males and females (dioecy) or to females 
coexisting with hermaphrodites (gynodioecy). Thus, despite being rare as a mating system, 
egg trading appears to offer ample opportunities for further study of the dynamics of 
cooperative exchanges. 
 
Finally, why is egg trading so rare, despite its protective effect on simultaneous 
hermaphroditism? Although egg trading stabilises hermaphroditism once fixed, it cannot 
facilitate the invasion of hermaphrodites into a dioecious population. Egg trading can only 
evolve if hermaphroditism is already established. More importantly, egg trading is itself 
under positive frequency-dependent selection, which creates a barrier to its initial invasion 
regardless of the level of sperm competition or mating rates (Henshaw et al. 2014b). This 
bootstrapping problem is common to all forms of direct reciprocity and is perhaps the 
primary reason why such behaviour is rare in nature (André 2015). Many aspects of mating 
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systems are similarly subject to complex evolutionary feedbacks, including different 
conditions for the origin and maintenance of traits, and formal models are needed to 
disentangle the stage-dependent changes in selection in these systems (Lehtonen and Kokko 
2012). 
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Figure 1: Processes predicted to influence the evolution and maintenance of egg trading. 
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Figure 2: (a) Egg trading selects for relatively female-biased sex allocation, with allocation 
to male function lower in traders (dashed lines,   
 ) than in non-traders (solid lines,   
 ). 
(b) Egg trading stabilises simultaneous hermaphroditism against invasion, as shown by 
a higher invasion threshold for pure females in trading populations (dashed lines,   ) 
than in non-trading populations (solid lines,   ). Both panels are shown with sperm 
competition high (green lines: window of time for streakers       and maximum 
number of streakers        ) and low (black lines: window of time for streakers 
       and maximum number of streakers       ) relative to the rate of mate 
encounters . Paternity of streakers is discounted by      . 
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